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1. Introduction 
Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA led to developments 
that transformed many biological sciences. This much seems obvious. But 
what were the relevant developments and how did they transform biology? 
Typically, it is taken for granted that the developments were theoretical. 
According to the popular view, which is frequently advanced by scientists and 
science writers, a new fundamental theory of molecular biology, constructed in 
the decades following Watson and Crick’s discovery, transformed biology by 
providing a basis for explaining a wide variety of phenomena. Some 
philosophers agree with this assessment. They argue that explanations 
provided by this DNA-centered theory “reduce” previous explanations that 
focused on entities at higher levels of organization. Other philosophers 
disagree. Some claim that reductionism failed biology because some 
phenomena are best explained at levels of organization higher than the 
molecular level. In this chapter, I will argue that discussions about whether 
molecular biology provides the fundamental theoretical basis for transforming 
biological sciences is based on a false premise. The developments following 
Watson and Crick’s discovery that mattered were not primarily theoretical. It is 
not the fundamental theory of molecular biology, if indeed such a theory 
exists, that revolutionized genetics and transformed biological sciences. What 
changed biology so dramatically was a retooling of the investigative strategies 
used in genetics. 
 Much of the philosophical discussion concerning what Watson and Crick’s 
discovery did for biology can be organized around two opposing views: 
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theoretical reductionism and layer-cake antireductionism. As is often the case 
with philosophical dichotomies, the most compelling arguments in this 
literature are those aimed against one or the other position, not those aimed in 
favor of a position. This suggests that it is time to move beyond the dichotomy. 
But we shouldn’t move too quickly; there are lessons to be learned from the 
reductionism debate. The first aim of this chapter is to diagnose where the two 
opposing views go astray. My diagnosis suggests that philosophical attention 
should be shifted from theory to practice. The second aim is to identify what 
Watson and Crick’s discovery did for the practice of genetics and to explain 
how the resulting changes in genetics transformed practice throughout many 
biological sciences. 
 Theoretical reductionism alleges that the relevant developments in genetics 
were a theoretical triumph. Before Watson and Crick, genetics was a science 
that explained patterns of trait transmission by appealing to a classical theory 
of the gene. The classical theory included the idea that genes are located on 
chromosomes, various principles about chromosomal mechanics, and 
principles about relationships between genes and outward phenotypic traits. 
Watson and Crick’s discovery, according to this view, led to a deeper and more 
fundamental, molecular-level theory. The new theory allegedly improves upon 
higher-level explanations of the classical theory by explaining its core 
theoretical principles in terms of molecular processes. 
 The picture of genetics that emerges from the view called “theoretical 
reductionism” is of a two-tiered science: an upper tier of theoretical principles 
associated with the classical theory of genetics and a lower tier of theoretical 
principles about molecular processes involving DNA. This picture can be 
extended to all of biology: A fundamental theory of biology centered on DNA 
deepens biological knowledge because its theoretical principles can ultimately 
explain or reduce the explanatory principles of all higher-level theories. The 
research program is to transform biology by reducing all biological theorizing 
to the fundamental theory associated with molecular biology. The success of 
DNA-based research, on this account, follows from the fundamental truth that 
all biological processes are ultimately directed or programmed by genes and 
DNA. 
 I call the opposing view “layer-cake antireductionism.” It also begins with 
the premise that Watson and Crick’s discovery led to a new DNA-based 
theory. But the phenomena explained by the DNA-based theory, according to 
this view, are not the same phenomena explained by the higher-level theory of 
classical genetics. Moreover, the molecular theory, which according to 
antireductionism is not more fundamental, does not explain the central 
theoretical principles of the higher-level theory; what it explains are peripheral 
principles. Hence, the molecular theory couched in terms of DNA does not 
actually improve upon the explanations of classical genetics; it contributes to 
genetics by adding explanations of phenomena that were not previously 
explained. 
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 The picture of genetics that emerges from this antireductionist view is also 
of a two-tiered science: an upper tier of theoretical principles aimed at 
explaining transmission phenomena and a lower tier of theoretical principles 
aimed at explaining other phenomena, such as the replication and expression of 
the genetic material (i.e., DNA). This picture, like the reductionist one, can 
also be extended to all of biology: The sciences of biology are like the layers of 
a cake, with each layer aimed at explaining the phenomena that are best 
explained at the level of organization corresponding to that layer. On this view, 
it cannot be the case that all life processes are directed by DNA because many 
phenomena cannot be explained at the molecular level. The take-home lesson 
of layer-cake antireductionism is that the DNA revolution is deeply 
problematic because it is based on a falsehood, not on a fundamental truth. It 
has been argued that a more-balanced research program that did not focus so 
much attention on genes and DNA would yield a truer, more holistic, and 
multileveled understanding of life.1 
 It is worth noting two features that theoretical reductionism and layer-cake 
antireductionism share. First, both advance “layer-cake” pictures. Not all 
reductionists accept the layer-cake image (e.g., Weber 2005), and some 
antireductionists seem more interested in advancing holism than multileveled 
holism (e.g., various contributors to Oyama et al. 2001). Nevertheless, many 
philosophers cling to the idea that biology is organized into separate sciences, 
each of which is focused on a particular level of organization. The second 
feature that these opposing views share is that they are almost exclusively 
focused on theory. Theory bias is ubiquitous, not just among theoretical 
reductionists and layer-cake antireductionists, but among philosophers of 
science in general.2 Removing this bias will enable us to look beyond the layer-
cake image and see what Watson and Crick’s discovery did for genetics and 
how the resulting development in genetics transformed scientific practice 
throughout much of biology. 
 
 This chapter starts with a review of the relevant theories of classical 
genetics and molecular biology. I begin my diagnosis of the reductionism 
debate by showing that the chief reasons offered in favor of layer-cake 
antireductionism do not correspond to the realities of genetics, and hence the 
antireductionist critique of theoretical reductionism is mistaken. Then I turn 
my attention to theoretical reductionism and show that the real problem with 
this view is that it fails to identify developments that are vital to genetics or 
                                                
1 This theme runs throughout much of the most-recent philosophical literature on molecular 
biology, even literature that does not directly engage the views about reductionism discussed 
here (e.g., see Oyama et al. 2001). 
2 Hacking (1983) identifies a general theory bias in history and philosophy of science and 
argues that it provides a distorted account of science. Rheinberger (1997) avoids this theory 
bias in his account of the historical development of molecular biologists’ understanding of the 
expression of DNA. 
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relevant to the transformation of other biological sciences. My diagnosis will 
show that layer-cake antireductionism and theoretical reductionism lead 
philosophical attention astray by focusing on explanatory theories rather than 
research practices. Turning my attention to practice, I describe how research in 
classical genetics was organized by an integration of modest explanatory 
reasoning (associated with the transmission theory) and bold strategies for 
investigating phenomena, including the “genetic approach.” Next, I show how 
the genetic approach has changed since Watson and Crick’s discovery by 
examining a recent gene-centered investigation. This example illustrates how 
molecular biologists have retooled genetics by integrating the genetic approach 
of classical genetics with physically based methods of biochemistry and new 
methods based on recombinant DNA and RNA interference technologies. I 
conclude that it is this kind of retooling, not the construction of a new 
fundamental theory, that has transformed so much of biology. 
2. The basic theory of classical genetics 
The basic theory that layer-cake antireductionists and theoretical reductionists 
associate with classical genetics explains the transmission of traits from 
parents to offspring. Classical geneticists, starting with Thomas H. Morgan 
(1926) and his collaborators, explained the transmission of phenotypic 
differences by following the distribution of gene differences from generation to 
generation and attributing the presence of alternative phenotypic traits to the 
presence of alternative forms of genes (called “alleles”). Their theory depended 
on the idea that genes are located in a linear fashion on chromosomes, on 
principles about the transmission of genes that were grounded in cytological 
processes such as meiosis, and on the principle that differences in genes cause 
differences in phenotypes. 
 I will illustrate the classical mode of explanatory reasoning with a simple 
historical example involving the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The mode 
of reasoning illustrated here is still an important part of genetics today. The 
experiment entailed breeding flies for several successive generations to 
produce distinctive inheritance patterns involving several different phenotypic 
traits (such as wing form), each of which was associated with a different gene. 
The basic aim of the experiment was to investigate the precise locations of the 
underlying genes. But it is unnecessary for my purposes in this section to 
describe the investigative reasoning or the intricate explanation of the complex 
inheritance patterns involving the transmission of several traits over a half 
dozen generations. It suffices to examine only a fragment of the explanation 
involving the transmission of one of the traits over a single generation. 
Let us examine how Morgan explained the transmission of eye color when 
red-eyed females crossed with purple-eyed males produced all red-eyed 
offspring. Investigators knew from previous experiments that red eye was 
Forthcoming in:  The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology Preprint 
Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction 
  
  5 
dominant to purple eye. That is, they knew that flies containing a copy of the 
purple allele on one of their chromosome IIs (or “second chromosomes”) and a 
copy of the red (“wild-type”) allele on their other chromosome II (pr / +) 
exhibited the trait associated with flies homozygous for the red allele (+ / +). 
They also knew that all female parents used at this stage of the experiment 
were homozygous for the red-eye allele (+ / +), and all males were 
homozygous for the purple-eye allele (pr / pr). 
The explanation of why crossing these red-eyed females with purple-eyed 
males yielded only red-eyed progeny proceeds, as do all classical explanations 
of inheritance patterns, in two stages. The first stage accounts for the 
distribution of genes and goes as follows: Each offspring received one copy of 
chromosome II from each parent. The maternally derived chromosomes must 
have contained the wild-type allele (since both second chromosomes of every 
female parent used in the experiment contained the wild-type allele). The 
paternally derived chromosomes must have contained the purple allele (since 
both second chromosomes of every male parent contained the purple allele). 
Hence, all offspring were heterozygous (pr / +). 
 The second stage of the explanation uses the result of the first stage, the 
genotypic makeup of the progeny, to draw an inference about their phenotypic 
appearance. Since all offspring were heterozygous (pr / +), and since purple is 
recessive to wild-type, all offspring had red eye color (the wild-type character). 
 This explanation depends only on the ideas that copies of the gene are 
distributed from generation to generation and that a difference in the gene (i.e., 
the difference between pr and +), whatever this difference is, causes the 
phenotypic difference in eye color. The idea that the gene is the difference 
maker needs to be qualified: Differences in the gene cause phenotypic 
differences in particular genetic and environmental contexts. This idea is so 
crucial and so often overlooked that it merits articulation as a principle:3 
 
Difference principle: Differences in a classical gene cause uniform 
phenotypic differences in particular genetic and environmental 
contexts. 
 
It is also worth noting that the difference principle provides a means to explain 
the transmission of phenotypic characteristics from one generation to the next 
without explaining how these characteristics are produced in the process of an 
organism’s development. The classical theory does not include and did not 
depend upon ideas about what genes are, how genes are replicated, what genes 
do, or how differences in genes bring about differences in phenotypic traits. 
                                                
3 See Waters 1994 for a fuller discussion. 
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3. The basic theory of molecular biology 
The basic theory that emerged after Watson and Crick’s discovery of the 
structure of DNA, which theoretical reductionists said would one day reduce 
the theory of classical genetics, provides an understanding of what classical 
genetics did not. It offers ideas about what genes are, how genes are replicated, 
what genes do, and how differences in genes bring about differences in 
phenotypic traits. According to this theory, genes are linear sequences of 
nucleotides in the double-helical molecules of DNA. Of course, not every 
string of nucleotides in DNA is a gene; segments of DNA are identified as 
genes according to what they do. Roughly speaking, genes serve as templates 
in the synthesis of RNA molecules. The result is that the linear sequence of 
nucleotides in a newly synthesized RNA molecule corresponds to the linear 
sequence of nucleotides in the DNA segment that served as the template. 
 Different RNA molecules play different functional roles in the cell, and an 
important class of RNA molecules, called messenger RNA (mRNA), play the 
role of template in the synthesis of polypeptide molecules. Newly synthesized 
polypeptides are linear sequences of amino acids that constitute proteins, and 
proteins play a wide variety of functional roles in the cell and organism (and 
environment). The ability of a polypeptide to function in specific ways 
depends on the linear sequence of amino acids of which it is formed. And this 
linear sequence corresponds to the linear sequence of triplets of nucleotides in 
RNA (codons), which in turn corresponds to the linear sequence of nucleotides 
in segments of DNA. This latter segment is the gene for that polypeptide.4 
 It is important to distinguish the basic theory of molecular biology, 
sketched in the paragraphs above, from fundamental theories that all biological 
processes are ultimately directed or programmed by genes (I will return to this 
idea in section 8). The basic theory, which states that genes are segments in a 
DNA double helix, suffices to explain how genes are replicated. Genes are 
replicated when the paired chains of a DNA molecule unwind and new chains 
are formed alongside the separating strands by the pairing of complementary 
nucleotides. When the process is complete, two copies of the original double 
helix have been formed, and hence the genes in the original DNA molecule 
have been effectively replicated. 
 The basic theory also explains how differences in genes can bring about 
differences in phenotypic traits. A difference in the nucleotide sequence of a 
gene will result in the difference in the nucleotide sequence of RNA molecules. 
Differences in mRNA molecules can in turn result in a difference in the amino 
acid sequence of a polypeptide. Differences in the linear sequences of amino 
acids in polypeptides (and in the linear sequences of nucleotides in functional 
RNA molecules) can affect the roles they play in the cell and organism, 
sometimes having an effect that is observable as a phenotypic difference. The 
                                                
4 See Waters 1994 and 2000 for a more-detailed account. 
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mutations (differences in genes) identified by the Morgan group (e.g., the 
purple-eye mutation) have been routinely identified as differences in 
nucleotide sequences in DNA. 
4. Layer-cake antireductionism 
Layer-cake antireductionism is the dominant view among philosophers 
interested in this debate, so it is appropriate to begin with this view.5 
According to layer-cake antireductionism, classical genetics will never be 
reduced, eliminated, or explained away because its central theory explains 
kinds of phenomena that are best explained at the level of classical genes and 
chromosomes. There are a number of arguments in the philosophical literature 
offered in support of this kind of view, but I will focus on two. First, it is 
claimed, genes cannot be conceived at the molecular level. Hence, 
explanations of classical genetics, which rely on principles about genes, will 
never be explained in terms of molecules. This argument alone does not rule 
out the possibility that classical genetics will be eliminated. Perhaps 
explanations couched in terms of genes will be discarded and all of the 
phenomena of genetics will be explained in terms of the physicochemical 
principles of molecules such as DNA, RNA, and polypeptides. 
Antireductionism rules out this possibility with a second claim: Classical 
genetics offers objectively better explanations of certain transmission 
phenomena than any molecular-level explanation could ever provide. 
4.1. Two unconnectable tiers of theoretical discourse 
The most rigorous formulation of the unconnectability idea can be found in the 
early writings of Alex Rosenberg, who formerly contended that there is an 
unbridgeable conceptual gap between the classical and molecular theories of 
genetics (1985, 1994). In support of this claim, he argued that relations 
between the gene concept of classical genetics and the concepts of molecular 
genetics are hopelessly complicated “many-many” relations that will forever 
frustrate any attempt to systematically connect the two theories. Rosenberg 
began his analysis by pointing out that, in classical genetics, genes are 
identified by way of their phenotypic effects. Classical geneticists identified 
                                                
5 Kitcher (1984) offers the fullest account of this position, which is reprinted in prominent 
anthologies without rejoinder (e.g., in volume 7 of The Philosopher’s Annual (Atascadero, 
Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1984); in Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J. D. 
Trout (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT 
Press, 1991); and in Martin Curd and Jan Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central 
Issues (New York: Norton, 1998). Although not everyone agrees with Kitcher’s entire account, 
various aspects of the position are supported by considerations that can be found throughout 
much of the literature. For example, see Wimsatt (1976a, 1976b), Darden and Maull (1977), 
Burian (1986, 1996), Collier (1988), and Dupré (1993). 
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the gene for purple eye color, for example, by carrying out carefully 
orchestrated breeding experiments and following the distribution of eye-color 
phenotypes in successive generations of a laboratory population. The reason 
classical genetics will never be reduced to a molecular-level science, according 
to Rosenberg (1985), is that there is no manageable connection between the 
concept of a Mendelian phenotype and that of a molecular gene: 
The pathway to red eye pigment production begins at many distinct 
molecular genes and proceeds through several alternative 
branched pathways.... The pathway from the [molecular] genes 
also contains redundant, ambiguous, and interdependent paths. If 
we give a biochemical characterization of the gene for red eye 
color either by appeal to the parts of its pathway of synthesis, or by 
appeal to the segments of DNA that it begins with, our molecular 
description of this gene will be too intricate to be of any practical 
explanatory upshot. (Rosenberg 1985, 101) 
Rosenberg concluded that, since the relation between molecular genes and 
Mendelian phenotypes is exceedingly complex, the connection between any 
molecular concept and the Mendelian gene concept must also be exceedingly 
complex, thereby blocking any systematic, reductive explanation of classical 
genetics in terms of molecular-level theory.6 
4.2. Why transmission phenomena are (allegedly) best explained at the 
chromosomal level 
The idea that the phenomena explained by the upper-tier theory of classical 
genetics cannot be better explained by the lower-tier theory of molecular 
genetics is clearly articulated by Philip Kitcher and can be found in several of 
his writings (e.g., Kitcher 1984, 1989, 2001). Following David Hull (1974), 
Kitcher assumes that classical genetics is transmission genetics. The classical 
theory explains the transmission of phenotypic traits, not the connection 
between genes and phenotypes nor the development of phenotypic traits in 
individual organisms. So, the special domain of phenomena explained by the 
upper-tier theory is the domain of transmission phenomena, the patterns of 
inheritance discussed in section 2 above. And transmission phenomena, on 
Kitcher’s account, are best explained at the level of cytology: 
The distribution of genes to gametes is to be explained, not by 
rehearsing the gory details of the reshuffling of the molecules, but 
                                                
6 Rosenberg has subsequently changed his position on this issue, largely on the grounds that 
technical advances in information storage and processing “may substantially enhance our 
capacity to understand macromolecular processes and their combinations” (Rosenberg 2006, 
14). 
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through the observation that chromosomes are aligned in pairs 
just prior to the meiotic division, and that one chromosome from 
each matched pair is transmitted to each gamete. (Kitcher 1984, 
370) 
 Kitcher states that the pairing and separation of chromosomes belong to a 
natural kind of pair-separation process; that is heterogeneous from the 
molecular perspective because different kinds of forces are responsible for 
bringing together and pulling apart different paired entities. The separation of 
paired entities, he claims, “may occur because of the action of electromagnetic 
forces or even nuclear forces; but it is easy to think of examples in which the 
separation is effected by the action of gravity” (Kitcher 1984, 350). For this 
reason, he concludes, the classical transmission theory will never be reduced or 
eliminated by the lower-level theory of molecular genetics. The lower-level 
theory, Kitcher says, is important because it explains what the classical theory 
cannot (see section 2). But what the classical theory can explain is not better 
explained by the molecular theory. 
4.3. Extending the layer-cake image 
The image of genetics that emerges from the antireductionist literature is of a 
two-tiered science composed of two discrete theoretical discourses, one 
grounded in principles about entities at the cytological level (such as 
chromosomes) and the other grounded in principles about entities at the 
molecular level (such as nucleotide sequences in DNA). This image is then 
extended to all of biology. Again, Kitcher is the most articulate proponent: 
[A]nti-reductionism emerges as the thesis that there are 
autonomous levels of biological explanation. Anti-reductionism 
construes the current division of biology not simply as a temporary 
feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections 
but as the reflection of levels or organization in nature. 
Explanatory patterns that deploy the concepts of cytology will 
endure in our science because we would foreswear [sic] 
significant unification (or fail to employ the relevant laws, or fail 
to identify the causally relevant properties) by attempting to derive 
the conclusions to which they are applied using the vocabulary and 
reasoning patterns of molecular biology. (Kitcher 1984, 371)  
According to layer-cake antireductionism, different biological sciences 
relate to particular levels of organization. Sciences aimed at levels of 
organization higher than molecular biology will endure, the antireductionists 
claim, because some phenomena are better explained at those higher levels of 
organization. 
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4.4. What’s wrong with layer-cake antireductionism 
The chief arguments offered in favor of layer-cake antireductionism in genetics 
fail to correspond to the actual science. This should have been apparent in the 
mid-1980s and is certainly evident today. Consider the argument that the two 
tiers of discourse corresponding to classical and molecular genetics cannot be 
systematically connected because claims made in terms of genes cannot be 
connected to claims couched in terms of DNA. This argument rests on the 
assumption that, in classical genetics, the relationship between a gene and a 
phenotypic trait is taken to be simple. But classical geneticists knew better. 
Consider what Sturtevant, one of Morgan’s star students and collaborators, had 
to say about genes and eye color: 
The difference between normal red eyes and colorless (white) ones 
in Drosophila is due to a difference in a single gene. Yet red is a 
very complex color, requiring the interaction of at least five (and 
probably of very many more) different genes for its production. 
And these genes are quite independent, each chromosome bearing 
some of them. Moreover, eye-color is indirectly dependent upon a 
large number of other genes such as those on which the life of the 
fly depends. We can then, in no sense identify a given gene with the 
red color of the eye, even though there is a single gene 
differentiating it from the colorless eye. So it is for all characters. 
(quoted from Carlson 66 69; my emphasis)  
 Sturtevant’s quotation suggests that the relationship between gene and eye 
color in classical genetics exhibited the same complexity that Rosenberg 
discussed at the molecular level (compare Sturtevant’s quotation to that of 
Rosenberg 1985 presented in section 4.1). It is not the case that the genotype-
phenotype relationships appear simple and uniform at the level of classical 
genetics and complicated and disunified at the molecular level. The situation 
appears similarly complex at both levels of analysis. 
 Classical genetics nevertheless finds a simple way to explain transmission 
phenomena by appealing to the difference principle, according to which 
particular differences in particular genes cause particular differences in 
phenotypic traits in particular contexts (see section 2). Sturtevant alludes to 
this principle in the first sentence of the quotation above and again in the 
emphasized clause. So the question arises: Can this relationship be captured at 
the molecular level? And the answer is yes. The differences used by classical 
geneticists to explain inheritance patterns have been routinely identified at the 
molecular level by contemporary geneticists. 
 The claim that the phenomena explained by classical genetics cannot be 
better explained at the molecular level fares no better. Antireductionism claims 
that the cytological level allegedly provides the best level of explanation 
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because explanations at this level uniformly account for a wide range of cases 
that would look heterogeneous from a molecular perspective. Kitcher claims 
that meiosis exemplifies this kind of situation. The uniformity of pair-
separation processes is evident at the cytological level, but is lost in the gory 
details at the molecular level where the process “may occur because of the 
action of electromagnetic forces or even of nuclear forces” (Kitcher 1984, 
350). But it is unclear what Kitcher has in mind. The molecular mechanisms 
underlying the pairing and separation of chromosomes are remarkably uniform 
in creatures ranging from yeast to human beings; it is not the case that some 
involve electromagnetic forces and others involve nuclear forces. Kitcher’s 
claim that “it is easy to think of examples in which the separation is effected by 
the action of gravity” has no basis in what molecular biologists have learned 
about the pairing and separation of chromosomes. In fact, in the two decades 
since Kitcher’s “Tale of Two Sciences” was first published, biologists have 
learned a lot about the pairing and separation of chromosomes and what they 
have learned does not support his contention that the processes are realized by 
different forces in different cases. 
 Meiosis is an unpromising candidate to advance the idea that what appears 
uniform at the level of classical genetics turns out to be heterogeneous at the 
molecular level. But this idea is illustrated by other genetic phenomena. 
Consider the phenomenon of genetic dominance. In classical genetics, 
examples of complete dominance are treated alike for the purposes of 
explaining transmission phenomena. But contemporary genetics reveals that 
there are several very different mechanisms underlying different instances of 
dominance. According to Kitcher’s unificationist theory of scientific 
explanation, the classical account of dominance provides an objectively better 
basis for explaining transmission phenomena because it provides a more 
unified organization of the phenomena. But this would imply that the shallow 
explanations of classical genetics are objectively preferable to the deeper 
explanations provided by molecular theory. 
 In sum, layer-cake antireductionism holds that biology will always be 
organized into layers with the theories of each layer representing different 
levels of organization. The layers will allegedly endure because some 
phenomena are, objectively speaking, best explained in terms of one level of 
organization and other phenomena are best explained at higher or lower levels. 
Genetics is often cited as a case in point. Classical genetics explains 
transmission patterns in terms of cytological processes, such as meiosis, which 
antireductionists argue cannot be adequately represented or explained at the 
molecular level. In contrast to these claims, molecular biologists are 
investigating processes, such as meiosis, at the molecular level. When one 
examines the results of this research, the antireductionist suggestion that these 
investigations are not producing better explanations of chromosomal processes, 
such as the pairing and separation of chromosomes, is simply false. Focusing 
attention at the molecular level, and on DNA, has been extremely fruitful for 
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research across a broad range of biological phenomena, including the 
phenomena behind the core theoretical principles of classical genetics. Layer-
cake antireductionism cannot offer a tenable account of what happened to 
biology after Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA. 
5. Theoretical reductionism 
Layer-cake antireductionism emerged in response to Kenneth Schaffner’s 
claim that genetics was in the process of being reduced to physics and 
chemistry (1969). He characterized this alleged reduction in terms of Thomas 
Nagel’s model of theoretical reduction. According to Nagel’s model, the 
reduction of one science to another science entails the reduction of the central 
theory of one science to the central theory of the other. Nagel believed that this 
kind of reduction led to progressive changes in scientific knowledge, including 
the establishment of more-accurate experimental laws that can explain a 
broader range of facts and the discovery of surprising connections among these 
laws. Schaffner claimed that this kind of reduction was currently taking place 
in biology where a theory aimed at a higher level of organization was being 
reduced to a theory aimed at a lower level of organization. The higher-level 
theory was the transmission theory of classical genetics; the lower-level theory 
was a newly emerging theory of molecular genetics. 
 Nagel described the ideal of theoretical reduction by specifying two formal 
requirements satisfied by successful reductions. In specifying these 
requirements, he made two assumptions. First, he assumed that theories consist 
of “laws.” Second, he assumed that explanations work by using laws to derive 
statements describing the phenomena to be explained. 
 One of the two formal requirements set out by Nagel held that the “laws” 
of the reduced theory must be derivable from the laws and associated 
coordinating definitions of the reducing theory. This deducibility requirement 
was intended to capture the idea that the explanatory principles (or laws) of the 
reducing theory ought to explain the explanatory principles (or laws) of the 
reduced theory. Nagel’s second formal requirement, the connectability 
requirement, was that all essential terms of the reduced theory must either be 
contained within or be appropriately connected to the terms of the reducing 
theory by way of additional assumptions. 
 Although nearly all discussions of Nagel’s model focus exclusively on 
these formal requirements, Nagel himself acknowledged that the formal 
conditions “do not suffice to distinguish trivial from noteworthy 
achievements” (Nagel 1961, 358). Nagel’s informal discussion of the 
thermodynamics case indicates that noteworthy reductions are marked by 
fruitfulness in inquiry. 
 Schaffner (1969) modified Nagel’s formal model by incorporating the idea 
that what the reducing theory actually derives (and hence explains) is a 
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corrected version of the reduced theory, not the original form of the theory. He 
argued that this revised model better captures reductions in the physical 
sciences. He intended to apply his model to biology by showing how the 
transmission theory of classical genetics was being corrected and reduced to a 
new theory of molecular genetics. 
 Schaffner claimed that, as the molecular theory of genetics developed, the 
laws of classical genetics, such as the law of dominance, would be revised in 
ways such that they would be derived from physicochemical laws of the 
molecular theory. His idea was that the revised laws would be more accurate 
than the laws postulated by classical geneticists. Schaffner was not arguing that 
the classical theory would be eliminated; he was arguing that it would be made 
more accurate and that it would be explained in terms of physicochemical 
principles. Hence, he was advancing a layer-cake view. In subsequent works, 
Schaffner has maintained, in the face of considerable criticism,7 that in 
principle at least, the project of theoretical reduction in genetics could be 
completed. 
5.1. What’s wrong with the theoretical reductionist account of genetics 
The problem with the theoretical reductionist account is that it focuses on 
something that is peripheral to advancing scientific research. Geneticists are 
not interested in explaining the principles of classical genetics in terms of 
physicochemical principles of molecular biology. As Schaffner admits: 
Jacob and Monod did not, in their research program, aim initially 
at providing chemical characterizations of the entities with which 
they worked, even though methods for at least beginning such 
characterizations were available. Such chemical analyses were 
extremely tedious and probably would not have provided any 
information about the interactions of the genes and their 
expression for a very long period of time. Accordingly, we can 
conclude that we have before us a paradigmatic example of theory 
construction in an area that is usually termed molecular biology or 
molecular genetics but that found many of the methods that would 
yield physicochemical characterizations of its elements irrelevant 
to its development. The short-term aim of Jacob and Monod was 
not to reduce genetics to physics and chemistry; it was to 
determine the principle governing the causal interactions of the 
entities responsible for enzyme induction and repression and for 
                                                
7 Schaffner’s position has been criticized by a number of philosophers, including David Hull 
(1974), William Wimsatt (1976a, 1976b), Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull (1977), Philip 
Kitcher (1984), Richard Burian (1986, 1996), John Collier (1988), John Dupré (1993), 
Alexander Rosenberg (1985, 1994), and Russell Vance (1996). 
Forthcoming in:  The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology Preprint 
Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction 
  
  14 
phage synthesis and latency. (Schaffner 1993, 512, footnote 
deleted)  
From a philosopher’s point of view, geneticists are frustratingly 
unprincipled. They are not driven by epistemological ideals, such as theoretical 
reductionism. They conceive of biological entities in loose molecular terms 
when it serves their proximate interests, and they do not see the point in 
systematically casting their explanations in physicochemical terms. Schaffner 
does not deny that developments stemming from Watson and Crick’s model of 
DNA were useful to Jacob and Monod’s research. But he seems to concede the 
point that his model of theoretical reduction does not help to reveal what the 
developments were or why they were useful. 
 One might try to rescue theoretical reduction by pointing out that, although 
the lower-level theory of molecular biology may not be couched in 
physicochemical terms, it is nevertheless couched in macromolecular terms. 
Hence, Jacob and Monod’s failure to explain their results in terms of chemistry 
would not count against reduction to molecular biology; it would only count 
against reduction to chemistry. But Schaffner’s “peripherality thesis” exposes a 
more-fundamental problem with the theoretical reductionist account of 
genetics. The real problem with the account is that it focuses attention on 
something peripheral to the achievement that has turned out to be so fruitful for 
biological research. 
 If our aim is to understand what DNA did for genetics and to identify the 
development in genetics that transformed many biological sciences, then the 
model of theoretical reduction won’t help. The problem isn’t that biologists 
cannot better explain at the molecular level what was once explained at the 
cytological level. Current research on processes such as meiosis and mitosis is 
being conducted at the molecular level and is yielding better explanations of 
these processes than can be offered at the cytological level. The problem is that 
seeking and obtaining these better explanations is not the development in 
genetics that has transformed biology. 
6. Beyond theoretical reduction and layer-cake antireduction 
Both the reductionist and antireductionist views assume that the relevant 
developments in genetics were theoretical (or explanatory). But neither offers a 
real explanation of how the theoretical developments transformed so much of 
biology. The development identified by theoretical reductionism, the 
explanation of higher-level theoretical principles in terms of lower-level 
principles, is tangential to the revolution in genetics. It is unclear how this 
tangential theoretical development could possibly be responsible for the 
transformation of biology. Layer-cake antireductionism alleges that the 
developments in genetics have yielded a divided science, one part aimed at 
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explaining transmission phenomena and another part aimed at explaining 
developmental phenomena. By extension, it seems to imply that biological 
disciplines established before 1953 should exhibit multiple theoretical tiers. 
But contemporary biology does not take the form of a layer cake. Furthermore, 
even if biology did consist of multiple levels of autonomous theories, it is quite 
unclear how a theory at the bottom of the cake could transform theories at 
higher levels unless something along the lines of theoretical reductionism was 
correct. 
 Layer-cake antireductionists might respond that the DNA-based theory at 
the bottom of the cake should not have transformative effects on the rest of 
biology. They could insist that molecular biology is destined to explain the 
leftovers and gory details of fields like physiology or embryology, which 
should keep their focus on higher-level principles. On this account, the DNA 
revolution represents a reductionist diversion that privileges phenomena that 
are best explained in terms of molecules and obscures phenomena best 
explained at higher levels of organization. A shortcoming of this view is that it 
lacks a compelling argument. We have seen that the argument from extension 
based on genetics won’t work (section 4.3). Neither does the abstract argument 
from multiple-realizability (see Sober 1999). Another problem with this view 
is that it does not explain why a theoretical layer under classical genetics ought 
to have a transformative effect on a different area, say, physiology. Something 
happened to genetics after 1953 that transformed much of biology. What was 
it? 
 A reductionist might respond to this quandary by seeking a new account of 
reduction, one that is not based on Nagel’s idea that the fruitful developments 
involve the explanation of high-level explanatory principles in terms of lower-
level principles. And indeed, philosophers have tried to identify the relevant 
developments in genetics by constructing models of reduction that depart from 
Nagel’s. But, as I will show, the revisionists do not let go of Nagel’s 
assumption that the reductive developments that increase the fruitfulness of 
research are theoretical or explanatory. 
 William Wimsatt (1976a) departs from Nagel’s model by rejecting the 
assumption that scientific theories are sets of law-like statements and the idea 
that explanations are arguments in which the phenomena to be explained are 
derived from laws. He uses Salmon’s account of explanation (Salmon 1971) to 
examine claims that molecular genetics offers reductive explanations. 
Likewise, Sahotra Sarkar (1998) rejects the account of theories and explanation 
presupposed in Nagel’s concept of reduction. In fact, he explicitly avoids 
relying on any particular account of scientific theories or theoretical 
explanation. Instead, he assumes that reductive explanations are explanations 
without specifying what an explanation is, and then seeks to identify the 
features that set reductive explanations apart from other explanations. 
 Wimsatt, Sarkar, and others (including Kitcher 1984) have sought to 
replace Nagel’s conception of reduction with a conception that does not 
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assume that scientific explanation involves subsumption under universal laws. 
In contrast, Weber (2005) seeks to replace Nagel’s conception with one that 
retains this idea. What Weber rejects is the Nagelian notion that reductionism 
in biology involves explaining higher-level biological laws. He argues that, 
with some rare exceptions, biological sciences don’t have laws. He contends 
that reductionism in biology involves explaining biological phenomena 
directly in terms of physical laws. Hence, he rejects the layer-cake conception 
of reduction implicit in Nagel’s account. This marks an important advance, but 
it still keeps the focus on theory. 
 Wimsatt’s writings on reduction (1976a, 1976b, 1978) emphasize the 
fruitfulness of attempting to achieve a reduction, even when a reduction is not 
achieved. He argues, for instance, that efforts to discover the molecular 
makeups of entities identified at higher levels is often fruitful, even when 
identities between levels cannot be found. Others have also argued that the role 
of reduction in science should emphasize the fruitfulness of reductive inquiry 
(Waters 1990; Sarkar 2000). But these accounts still have something in 
common with Nagel’s: They focus on how geneticists explain or try to explain 
phenomena, not on how they manipulate or investigate phenomena. This is 
even true of Wimsatt’s (1976a) account of heuristics, which stresses heuristics 
for explanation. 
 Russell Vance (1996) offers a more-thorough shift in attention from theory 
to investigative practice. He argues that there is only one contemporary science 
of genetics on the grounds that investigative methods of classical genetics are 
an essential part of the methodology of what is called molecular genetics. He 
concludes that reductionism fails because contemporary genetics still depends 
on methods of classical genetics involving breeding experiments. Vance’s 
picture of genetics is compelling. The laboratory methods of classical genetics 
do indeed carry on, even as they are greatly extended, augmented, and often 
replaced by techniques involving direct intervention on DNA. But Vance’s 
picture does not match the layer-cake image of a two-tiered science and the 
antireductionist contention that the explanatory principles of classical genetics 
(and the phenomena that they help to explain) cannot be better explained at the 
molecular level. Vance does not provide a defense of antireductionism. What 
he offers is a convincing reason to shift attention to investigative practice. 
 In the next two sections, I will show that conceiving science as an 
investigative practice involving an interplay of methodological and 
explanatory reasoning leads to a different image of genetics and a new idea 
about how it developed after Watson and Crick’s discovery. The image is not 
of a two-tiered science, one (classical genetics) aimed at investigating and 
explaining transmission phenomena and another (molecular genetics) aimed at 
investigating and explaining developmental phenomena. Instead, there is one 
science that retains much of the investigative and explanatory reasoning of 
classical genetics by (a) reconceptualizing its theoretical basis modestly in 
molecular terms and (b) retooling its basic investigative approach by 
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integrating its methodologies with physically based methods of biochemistry 
and new methods of recombinant DNA and RNA interference technologies. 
7. What was classical genetics? 
Philosophical accounts of classical genetics reflect the way philosophers think 
about scientific knowledge. We typically analyze science by identifying central 
explanatory theories. Then, for each theory, we analyze its special concepts 
and principles (or laws), detail how it can be applied to explain various 
phenomena, reconstruct how it is justified, explore how it might be further 
developed or how its explanatory range might be extended (the so-called 
research program), and consider how it should be interpreted (e.g., 
instrumentally or realistically). This approach has yielded agreement about 
classical genetics: The science was centered on a theory of transmission 
genetics (the one developed by Morgan and his collaborators), and the research 
program was organized around efforts to improve this theory’s explanations of 
heredity and to expand the range of inheritance phenomena that it could 
explain. 
 I will use a different, less theory-dominated philosophical approach in this 
section (see Waters 2004 for a fuller account). Instead of viewing classical 
genetics in terms of an organizing theory, I will view genetics as a science 
organized by an integration of explanatory reasoning (associated with a theory) 
and investigative strategies aimed toward developing knowledge about 
phenomena which fall outside the explanatory domain, even the potential 
explanatory domain, of any existing theory. I have already sketched parts of 
the explanatory reasoning in section 2. Now, it is time to turn to a central 
investigative strategy of classical genetics, the genetic approach. I will begin 
by describing an example, Sturtevant’s investigation of reductions in the rate 
of chromosomal crossing over. 
7.1. An integration of explanatory and investigative reasoning 
The literature of classical genetics is quite complex, but the basic explanatory 
pattern remains the same: Patterns of inheritance are explained by tracing gene 
transmission and attributing the presence of alternative traits to the presence of 
alternative alleles. Sometimes, classical explanations become more 
complicated because the transmission of genes can involve intricate 
chromosomal processes. The process of crossing over, for instance, exhibits 
many variations. While early introductory textbooks often reported that the 
frequency of crossovers between any two loci was constant (e.g., Sturtevant 
and Beadle 1939), more technical reports indicated that crossover frequency 
varies with temperature, age of female parents, chromosomal context of the 
segment containing the loci, and the presence of mutant crossover reducers on 
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the same chromosome (e.g., Bridges and Morgan 1923). The explanation of the 
dramatic decrease in crossing over allegedly caused by the presence of mutant 
crossover genes illustrates how geneticists working on special problems 
nevertheless depended on the same basic explanatory pattern. More important, 
it reveals how “transmission studies” were carried out in order to investigate 
basic biological processes. 
 The first crossover modifier found in Drosophila, CIIIA, reduced crossing 
over in the region around ebony in the third chromosome. This modifier did 
not reduce crossing over when present in homozygous form (Bridges and 
Morgan 1923, 89–92). After discovering CIIIA, geneticists discovered several 
additional crossover modifiers. At first, it was generally presumed that the 
modifiers were mutant genes, and geneticists mapped their locations. But 
Sturtevant noted that the dramatic decrease in crossover might be caused by an 
inverted section of the chromosome, rather than by a mutation in a single gene. 
He later mapped the region around the CIIIB modifier and showed that the 
order of the genes in the affected region was reversed (Sturtevant 1926). 
Crossing over was reduced in Drosophila heterozygous for CIIIB because 
genes in the inverted region of the CIIIB chromosome were not positioned 
across from the corresponding genes in the wild-type chromosome during 
meiosis. Crossing over was not reduced in flies homozygous for CIIIB because 
the order of the genes was the same in both third chromosomes of these flies. 
 In order to map the region around the CIIIB modifier region, Sturtevant 
conducted many carefully orchestrated breeding experiments. These 
experiments produced inheritance patterns, which he subsequently explained 
using the transmission theory (along the lines described in section 2). These 
explanations, however, were not what made Sturtevant’s work on CIIIB 
important. Finding explanations for the complex inheritance patterns exhibited 
in his carefully arranged breeding experiments was the means rather than the 
ends. Sturtevant’s research on CIIIB was important because of what it revealed 
about synaptic attraction between chromosomes during the process of meiosis. 
Hermann Muller had already pointed out that the most notable feature of 
genes, other than their autocatalysis, was “the highly specific attraction which 
genes (or local products formed by them) show for each other” (Muller 1922, 
37). Muller explained that what was particularly remarkable about this mutual 
attraction was that  
 when the gene mutates, the forces become readjusted, so that they 
may now attract material of the new kind; this shows that the 
attractive or synaptic property of the gene, as well as its catalytic 
property, is not primarily dependent on its specific structure, but 
on some general principle of its make-up, that causes whatever 
specific structure it has to be auto-attractive (and autocatalytic). 
(Muller 1922, 37–38)  
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 Opponents of the Morgan school of classical genetics were skeptical of 
Muller’s claims about the physical relationship between genes and 
chromosomes. Sturtevant’s finding that chromosomal inversions reduced 
crossover was important because it favored the idea that mutual attraction 
between genes was responsible for the mutual attraction between homologous 
chromosomes during meiosis and because it suggested that the process of 
crossing over depended on the close affinity of homologous genes. 
7.2. The genetic approach 
Sturtevant’s research on the crossover modifier illustrated a pattern of 
reasoning that was not just central to research in the later 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s, 
but is still central to the practice of genetics today. Biologists call it the 
“genetic approach.” This approach, as exemplified in the research of the 
Morgan school, is to (a) identify naturally occurring or artificially produced 
mutants that exhibit a difference relevant to some biological process of 
interest, (b) carry out genetic analyses of the mutants, and (c) recombine the 
mutants to learn more about the process of interest. In a way, the strategy isn’t 
new. Physiologists had long investigated various mechanisms, such as the 
mammalian circulatory system, by interfering with its parts and observing what 
happens. Home mechanics use this investigative approach to learn how 
machines work. What is new is the idea that one could tinker with a process, 
such as sex determination, by recombining genetic mutations. 
 The genetic approach had mixed success in classical genetics. It tended to 
be most successful in the study of chromosomal mechanics. For example, 
when Sturtevant applied the strategy to investigate the process of crossing over 
(section 2), he learned about the cause of dramatic decreases in crossover rates 
affecting various regions of the second and third chromosomes. More 
important, he also learned about the basic biological process of chromosome 
synapsis: His results supported ideas about the auto-attraction of genes and 
confirmed the notion that the mechanism of crossing over was facilitated by 
the matching of genes in homologous chromosomal segments. 
 The genetic approach for investigating biological processes was not 
confined to studies of chromosomal mechanics. It was also used to learn about 
gene action, mutation, development, and evolution. Mutants involving dosage 
effects and genetic mosaics were often investigated in order to shed light on 
gene action or on broader issues of development, such as sex determination. 
Interests in gene action also led researchers to investigate position effects. 
These studies often involved chromosomal aberrations. Generally, this 
research did not live up to the promise of yielding important new knowledge 
about gene action or development (at least in the short run). But chromosomal 
aberrations were also investigated to learn more about processes of 
chromosomal mechanics (e.g., translocation, unequal crossing over, 
nondisjunction, etc.) and evolution (e.g., speciation). As Robert Kohler (1994) 
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has astutely noticed, even when no light was shed on the phenomenon of 
interest, genetic studies still yielded publishable information about the 
existence and genetic location of new alleles and, we might add, about 
processes of chromosomal mechanics or evolutionary relationships. This helps 
to explain why the underlying investigative strategies have disappeared in 
hindsight. Whether successful or not, the investigative strategies of the genetic 
approach were an integral part of the reasoning of classical genetics. 
8. The retooling of genetics 
Developments following from Watson and Crick’s discovery led to a retooling 
of the genetic approach, which I will illustrate with an investigation of neurons 
in C. elegans. A central aim in C. elegans research is to learn how the nervous 
system of this nematode works. The explanatory goal of the research program 
corresponds to what Robert Cummins (1975) calls a “functional analysis.” 
Investigators want to explain how the nervous system works by finding out 
how parts of the nervous system contribute to its various capacities. Hence, 
when they ask, “what is the function of this structure in the nervous system?” 
they are seeking an account of how the structure contributes to one or another 
capacity of the system of which it is a part. The series of experiments I 
describe were aimed at determining the function of a protein, ß-spectrin, in 
neurons. 
 ß-spectrin is part of a spectrin-based membrane skeleton that exists as a 
cytoskeletal structure contained in most cells, but these experiments concerned 
the function of this protein in nerve cells. Prior experiments had revealed that 
organisms lacking ß-spectrin exhibit neuronal defects. In addition, biologists 
had already conducted imaging experiments to determine the distribution of 
this protein. They learned that it is contained in the growth cones of neurons, 
which indicated that this protein functions in the outgrowth of axons and 
dendrites. This study, conducted by Marc Hammarlund, Erik Jorgensen, and 
Michael Bastiani (2007), was aimed at learning more about the role of ß-
spectrin. 
 Hammarlund, Jorgensen, and Bastiani implemented an enhanced version of 
the genetic approach. They manipulated the system under study by 
manipulating various genes, including the gene for ß-spectrin called unc-70. 
Their first goal was to determine whether ß-spectrin functions in axon 
outgrowth. They began by inserting a gene for green fluorescent protein (GFP) 
under the control of a regulatory region that distributed this protein in the 
growth cone of nerve cells. This enabled them to observe growth of nerve cells 
as they extended from the ventral side to the dorsal side during embryogenesis. 
Next, they used a mutation of unc-70 to observe what happened to the growth 
pattern of these cells in the absence of ß-spectrin. They observed that the 
growth pattern was not disrupted. This result conflicted with the idea that the 
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function of ß-spectrin was to facilitate the outgrowth of axons and dendrites 
(since such growth occurred without the molecule). They obtained similar 
results when they conducted experiments on the extension of other neuronal 
processes. The investigators concluded that ß-spectrin does not contribute to 
the growth capacity of these neurons. 
 Hammarlund, Jorgensen, and Bastiani inferred that since axon outgrowth 
does not require ß-spectrin, neuronal defects that were observed in animals 
lacking ß-spectrin occur after outgrowth has occurred. They pursued this idea 
by observing axon morphology at different life stages. Again, they used the 
genetic approach, manipulating genes to insert reporter proteins so they could 
image neuronal extensions and to shut off the production of ß-spectrin. They 
observed the accumulation of a number of defects that had never been 
observed in wild-type animals, including breaks in the neuronal extensions 
(from ventral to dorsal), postembryonic growth cones, and aberrant branching 
of neuronal extensions. They observed similar accumulations of defects in 
processes of other types of neurons as well. Additional observations and 
considerations led them to the conclusions that the primary defect was the 
break in the long axon extensions and that the postembryonic growth cones 
and aberrant branching were consequences of the breaking. This suggested two 
possible functions of ß-spectrin in neurons: 
First, ß-spectrin might be involved in the addition of membrane to 
axons during growth of the organism (Morris 2001). Because 
worms increase in length and circumference during development, 
failure to insert membrane into axons could cause them to break. 
Alternatively, ß-spectrin might protect neurons against the acute 
strains caused by movement. (Hammarlund et al. 2007, 272)  
 To explore these two possibilities, they prevented the unc-70 mutated 
worms from moving so the mutant axons would not experience the acute 
strains normally caused by movement. They prevented the worms from 
moving by using RNAi (interference RNA) to prevent the expression of a 
muscle myosin gene. That is, they used the genetic approach. In this case, they 
manipulated the functioning of one component in the system (myosin) to learn 
about the role of a different component (ß-spectrin). Although they did not 
directly manipulate the myosin gene itself, they manipulated its expression by 
directly manipulating a gene for RNAi. They used genes as investigative 
levers. 
 The experiment revealed that RNAi largely rescued the neuronal defects of 
animals lacking ß-spectrin. This indicated that, by preventing movement, 
experimenters also prevented the breakage of axons. However, there is another 
possibility. Perhaps the suppression of axon breakage resulted from some 
effect of RNAi other than paralysis. To test against this possibility, they 
manipulated the expression of a different gene, Twitchin, which rendered 
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mutant worms incapable of coordinated movements, such as deep body bends, 
the kind of movements that result in acute strains of axons. The result of this 
experiment was a partial rescue of the wild-type phenotype (i.e., a reduction in 
axon breakage in unc-70 mutants). Hammarlund, Jorgensen, and Bastiani 
concluded that ß-spectrin’s role is to “protect neurons against breakage 
cause[d] by movement-induced strain” (2007, 272). To express this conclusion 
in a causal role idiom: The function of ß-spectrin is to contribute to the 
structural integrity capacity of neurons to withstand acute, movement-induced 
strain. 
 The investigation of the role of ß-spectrin illustrates how genetics has 
developed since Watson and Crick’s discovery of DNA and why this 
development has transformed much of biology. The development involved a 
new basic theory that recast ideas of classical genetics in terms of molecules 
(as described in section 3). What makes this theoretical recasting so important 
isn’t that it improves upon the explanation of inheritance patterns or helps to 
explain causal regularities of classical genetics at a lower level of organization. 
It is accomplishing both of these, but these successes are peripheral to the 
development in genetics that has transformed much of biology. The recasting 
of the basic theory is important because it makes it possible for biologists to 
retool and build upon the basic investigative approach of genetics. 
 Old views die hard. Some might try to rescue the idea that the relevant 
development stemming from Watson and Crick’s discovery must have been 
primarily theoretical, and insist that a new fundamental theory of biology has 
been established (e.g., along the lines of Rosenberg 2006). According to this 
view, which might be called “genetic reductionism,” biologists have identified 
the fundamental units of life in DNA. These units—genes and extragenic 
regions of DNA—program development by directing the synthesis of RNA 
and polypeptide molecules. The reason this theoretical development has 
transformed biology is because a broad range of biological sciences has 
adopted the research program of completing the fundamental theory. This 
theory, the genetic reductionist might claim, can inform all biological research 
by providing the basic pattern of explanatory reasoning that can be filled out 
and applied to explain everything that happens in an organism. 
 The investigation of ß-spectrin described here shows what is wrong with 
this account. The development in genetics that advanced Hammarlund, 
Jorgensen, and Bastiani’s investigation did not rest on any fundamental theory; 
the basic theory of molecular biology (described in section 3) sufficed. 
Furthermore, and this warrants particular stress, the basic theory of genetics 
was used only to help construct experiments and to explain experimental 
results. The explanation ultimately gained from the experimentation, the 
explanation concerning the role of ß-spectrin in the maintenance of neuronal 
structural integrity, does not even refer to genes or to DNA. So the idea that a 
fundamental theory of DNA is responsible for the remarkable success of DNA-
centered research is not supported by this example. I submit that this study is 
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representative of much of the research in contemporary gene-centered 
investigations. Genes are used as levers to manipulate and investigate a wide 
variety of biological processes.8 
9. Conclusion 
What made the recasting of genetics in terms of DNA so important for genetics 
and transformative for biology? Recasting the basic theory meant that the 
interplay between theoretical reasoning and investigative strategies could yield 
new methodologies that greatly increased the investigative powers of the 
genetic approach. This was important for genetics because it dramatically 
increased its investigative utility. This has been transformative for biology 
because the genetic approach, and other strategies from genetics, can now be 
utilized in many different disciplines of biology. The key to understanding 
what DNA did for biology is to stop being distracted by theoretical sideshows 
and focus on the main event. 
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